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Abstract 
There is a large body of evidence documenting gender differences in preferences and their 
effects on a range of behaviours (including health and risky behaviours) and choices (including 
education, labour market, savings, marriage, and fertility). A key issue in order to mitigate 
some of the undesirable effects of these differences (the tendency for boys to engage in more 
risky behaviours or for girls to avoid choices that might instead benefit them) is establishing 
how soon such differences arise. Gender differences in competitiveness and risk aversion have 
been widely documented both in the lab and the field (Falk et al, 2015), and more recently 
adapting experiments normally performed with adults to children (Samak, 2013; Harbaugh et 
al., 2002).  We advance this literature with a study of primary school children which consists 
of an innovative two-stage task game addressing both effort and risk: in the first stage a real 
effort task allows children to accumulate points playing a video game, and in the second they 
play a lottery game in which probabilities are presented visually. The two-stage task game is 
designed in order to avoid both the valuation and the probability problems that children 
normally face in such tasks. Our findings confirm the existence of gender differences in risk 
aversion once controlling for performance in a gender neutral task in schoolchildren, and 
contribute a visual way of using lotteries with children that yields results consistent with 
rational behaviour. 
JEL classification 
C79; C90; D81; J70 
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1. Introduction 
 
There is a large record of studies looking at how women differ from men in risky preferences, 
and risk aversion has often been studied as one of the possible causes of the pay gender gap 
(women may self-select in less risky, therefore less remunerative, occupations). Croson and 
Gneezy (2009) report gender differences in preferences, distinguishing three main categories: 
risk preferences, social preferences and competitive preferences. Recent findings from the 
Global Preference Survey (Falk et al, 2015) suggest that women tend to be less patient and 
more risk averse and exhibit a stronger social predisposition than men across all 90 cultures 
included in the survey, and these differences in preferences are also strongly linked with a 
range of behaviours and choices, including in relation to education, fertility and labour markets. 
 
It is important to understand what generates this difference, as the answer would shape the 
policies in a completely different way: if risk aversion is genetically inherited, then the matter 
would be to find out the right incentives to modify behaviours. On the contrary, if risk aversion 
depends on the environment around, then the target would be to interact with the family 
background and the culture transmitted behaviours since early childhood.  
 
Evolutionary psychologists (Eals and Silverman 1994, Nicholson 1997) suggest risk aversion 
may be an inherited trait that comes from the hunter-gatherer ancestral society, where women 
had to self-preserve in order to safeguard their reproductive potential. This trait would then 
have settled over the ages with species selection (Fine, 2014). A different explanation for 
gender differences in risk aversion arises instead from the role of environmental factors on 
human behaviours, including the selection of particular technologies (Alesina et al, 2013).  
 
Gneezy et al. (2009) represents a fundamental contribution to the debate, focusing on the 
gender differences in competitiveness. By means of an artefactual field experiment, the authors 
compare gender differences in competitiveness in two different types of society: a Matrilineal 
one (the Khasi tribe in India) and a Patriarchal (the Masai tribe in Tanzania). They find 
significant gender differences in competition: in particular women in the Khasi tribe show more 
competitive preferences than men in both tribes. A similar result is found by Booth and Nolen 
(2012) and Booth, Cardona-Sosa and Nolen (2014) in both risky and competitive behaviours.  
Booth and Nolen (2012) compare the effect that single-sex schools have on female attitudes 
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toward risk. The experimental subjects are students from eight different UK secondary schools 
(from the counties of Essex and Suffolk), half of which single sex school and the other half co-
ed (i.e. gender mixed) schools. Students participated in three different treatments: a real stake 
lottery, a hypothetical lottery and a general survey based on the self-assessment of the risk by 
each individual. Interestingly, their results confirm the effect that the single-sex school 
environment and also the single-sex group have on female risk attitude: girls have a higher 
preference for risky choices when attending a single sex school and when they are allocated to 
an all-female group (despite the school attended). Similar results are found in laboratory 
experiments, confirming that there is a significant difference between the female and male risk 
attitudes even in a controlled environment (Eckel 2008, Eckel and Grossman 2008)1. 
 
Most evolutionary behavioural theories assert that gene-environment interactions cannot really 
be disentangled, and in order to understand the potential for intervention rather focus on tracing 
the ages at which gender differences arise. Samek (2013) finds no significant gender 
differences in competitive behaviours on a sample of pre-schoolers aged 3 to 5 years old. Her 
study measures competiveness by means of a piece rate versus tournament incentive scheme 
in a controlled experiment, specifically adapted for the young age of the participants. She uses 
a real effort task consisting in a fishing game: children had a magnet pole serving as fishing 
rod to catch fish on a spinning plate. The game consisted of three rounds. In the first round 
children played under the piece rate incentive scheme, so each fish caught earned one candy. 
In the second round, they were playing in a tournament incentive scheme where only the winner 
of the tournament got two candies for each fish caught. In the third round, children had the 
choice to select the incentive scheme between piece rate and tournament. The use of non-
monetary rewards is one of the adaptations that need apply when designing incentives schemes 
for young children, who are not normally capable of making meaningful value comparisons 
when money is involved (valuation problem). 
Cardenas et al. (2012) studies competitiveness and risk taking of children aged 9 to 12 years 
old comparing two different countries: Colombia and Sweden. The initial hypothesis is that in 
Colombia, due to a higher gender inequality, boys are more competitive than girls; whereas in 
Sweden no differences were expected. As far as risk taking is concerned, boys were expected 
to be more risk lover than girls and a wider gap was expected in Colombia with respect to 
                                                          
1 For a complete and critical overview on the role that gender has on preferences over risk read 
Crosetto and Filippin (2015). 
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Sweden. The study makes use of two different tasks to evaluate individual competitiveness: in 
an outdoor physical activity they were competing in running and skipping rope, whereas in the 
indoor activity they had to either compete in a math or word search. The risk evaluation was 
composed by six choices similar to the Holt and Laury lotteries modified for children. 
Interestingly, this study finds that, while there is no significant gender difference in competitive 
behaviour in both countries, as far as risk aversion is concerned boys are more risk lover than 
girls, especially in Colombia. 
 
When aiming to assess risk aversion in children, a further complication arises in that it is 
essential that experimental subjects understand the concept of probabilities linked to the 
different lotteries and individual’s choice over lotteries is sensitive to change in expected value. 
This is especially difficult to assume when experimental subjects are very young, as 
schoolchildren’s ability in probabilistic reasoning is strictly related to individual mathematical 
ability (Nunes et al., 2015).  We call this the probability problem. One of the first attempts to 
look at the origins of risk aversion and its evolution over time by means of a monetary 
incentivized controlled experiment is the study by Harbaugh et al (2002). Changing the payoffs 
according to the age of the participants, the authors use simple lotteries where experimental 
subjects need to choose between a certain amount of money and a variable lottery where only 
the probabilities changed. They report higher risk loving behaviour at young age, which 
decreases with age. However, this study strongly rely on children’s ability to process lotteries 
output.  
 
In our study we examine gender difference in risk aversion among children between 9 and 11 
years of age attending primary schools in northern Italy. Addressing the shortcomings of 
previous studies of risk evaluations of schoolchildren, we introduce a two-stage task game 
specifically designed to avoid both the valuation and the probability problems. The first stage 
of the game acts as a real effort task where children earn points playing a video-game. In the 
second stage, the points initially earned acted as starting points for a lottery game where 
children choose between a very simple safe and a risky option. The task has been designed in 
such a way children’s risk preferences are revealed by the lottery choice, for which the points 
earned in the first part of the experiment act as endowment. The final score was then converted 
in sugar free jellies which were handed out to the participants by the experimenters at the end 
of the session. 
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2. Experimental Design 
The experiment was run in 2013 in Turin (Italy), during the annual Turin Bookfair, an 
international book events that brings together editors, book writers and readers from all over 
the world. The fair has a special section on books for children. Our participants were 
schoolchildren from primary schools aged 9-11 attending a one-day school trip to the book fair 
and taking part in a series of talks and events. The activities included meetings with popular 
book writers, group discussions, movie shows, group activities and computer activities in a 
digital lab. Our experiment was one of the activities included in the digital lab, where children 
learnt about new educational apps and interacted with iPads.  A total of 100 children took part 
in the experiment over three days, all coming from primary schools in the Turin area. 
Schoolchildren arrived in groups chaperoned by two teachers. After the registration at the book 
stand, the four experimenters divided the children in two or more groups, depending on class 
size. The experiment was played by 6 schoolchildren per time on iPads, which were specifically 
set for running only that specific activity and had no access on other activities during the 
experiment. The experimenters brought each child to the iPad dock station and touched the 
button to get to the first screen of the experiment. At the start, the lead experimenter explained 
the game to participants. In order to keep children’s attention during the explanation, the 
experimenter memorized instructions and explained the game without reading them out. 
Keeping eye contact with the young participants was important for maintaining their attention 
alive and understanding if something was unclear in the instructions. Graphical examples of 
the game and the lotteries were provided during the explanation. A particular emphasis was 
given to the explanation of the lotteries: we graphically presented every lottery and we 
compared the two choices showing what exactly meant the choice between the safe option and 
the risky options. In order to explain the difference between the risky and safe choice in terms 
of final output we used two small coloured fabric bags. In one green fabric bag there was the 
plastic number corresponding to the safe option points; whereas the blue fabric bag was either 
empty or with the plastic number corresponding to the risky option. The experimenter went 
through a detailed explanation of the tasks two times and each time children were asked if they 
had understood. The first time the experimenter explained the instructions very carefully 
without the use of the ipad. The second time the children had the possibility to practice to the 
game and the lotteries by using the button Play 1, while the experimenter repeated the 
instructions. Immediately after the explanation was concluded, participants were allowed to 
raise their hands and ask questions one at the time to the experimenters, who approached the 
6 
 
child and directly replied to the posed question. The experiment then began pushing the button 
Play 2.  
In addition to the experiment, we also asked children to complete a short survey including a 
few basic questions with set options to gather information on parents’ occupation and after 
school arrangements (whether with family, at school or at home with a baby sitter), in order to 
assess the extent to which they spent time with their school peers (by remaining in afterschool) 
and with their families. Peer effects have been extensively studied, including in education 
(Calvo-Armengol et al., 2007), and Sacerdote (2014) finds that although some of these effects 
are highly context specific (notably test scores and exam performance), significant and strong 
peer effects have consistently been found in studies of risky behaviours (crime, drinking, 
smoking) and in career choices. Preferences are also found to be strongly linked to parental 
attitudes and preferences (Alan et al. 2014), as well as the amount of parental time invested in 
children (Zumbühl et al, 2013), and recent work by Johnston et al. (2014) making use of the 
1970 British Cohort Study finds that gender role attitudes of mothers and children’s measured 
25 years apart are strongly correlated and that both the human capital and the labour supply of 
daughters (and that of sons’ partners) are strongly affected by their mothers’.  
 
2.1 The Real Effort Task  
The experimental literature presents copious and variegated examples of real effort tasks. From 
the slider (Gill and Prowse, 2012) to the maze (Gneezy et al., 2003), solving tasks as the 2-
digit game (Vesterlund and Nierderle, 2007) and the counting-zeros (Abeler et al., 2011) or 
simply entering data in a computer (Gneezy and List, 2006), their key feature is that they elicit 
a concrete effort exerted by the participant responding to the underlying incentives. Real effort 
tasks have been applied to study different individual decision processes (Lezzi et al., 2015, 
Rosaz and Villeval, 2012) both in the lab and in the field. The majority of these experiments 
study labour market applications in a laboratory setting (Brandts and Charness, 2004; Dohmen 
and Falk, 2011; Sutter and Weck-Hannemann, 2003).  
 
In the last decade, there have been also several applications of real effort task in field 
experiments, some of which compared the results found in the field with previous literature 
based on laboratory experiments in search of corroboration. Gneezy and List (2006) use two 
different real effort tasks to test the gift exchange hypothesis in an “actual labour market”. They 
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compare the results from the field experiment with the average results from the gift exchange 
in the lab experiments. A group of participants were hired for a one time job at a public library 
to enter data on a list of books. The second group participated to a door-to-door fundraising 
campaign for a university research centre. The results they found was that the real effort task 
in a field experiment context confirmed the lab experiments results only in the short term, 
whereas after a few hours the task was started the gift effect on labour productivity decayed. 
Falk and Ichino (2006) designed a field experiment to evaluate the effect of peer pressure on 
individual productivity. The task consisted in filling envelopes with a letter. In the treatment 
group, participants were completing the task in group of two in the same room, getting the 
possibility to observe the work completed by the other worker. In the control group, subjects 
were completing the task alone, without any other participant in the same room. Comparing 
treatment and control group Falk and Ichino (2006) found that peer effect has a strong influence 
on individual productivity of stuffing envelopes, increasing the final output by 16%. 
In the last decade, real effort tasks have been used also to study the origins of preferences and 
to elicit individual decision making since young age. In Calsamiglia et al. (2013) 
schoolchildren were required to solve Sudoku games in order to evaluate the effect of 
affirmative action policies on tournament performance and on incentives schemes.  Belot and 
Van de Ven (2011) test whether favouritism has any detrimental effect on individual 
performance in a tournament. Schoolchildren aged 6 to 8 and 10 to 12 were involved in a 
physical real effort game, moving as many balls as possible from one basket to another in 30 
seconds. The authors were interested in studying the effect that favouritism has in terms of 
work environment efficiency and they found schools as the perfect environment for tackling 
their research question:  “school children interact with each other on a daily basis and are 
embedded in a long-term social network” (Belot and Van de Ven, 2011, p.1248) similar to 
what happens in the workplace. The results showed that despite children tends to favour their 
friends, the favouritism generate a reciprocal sentiment that boost effort in the real effort game. 
 Alan et al. (2016) use a mathematical real effort task in order to evaluate the effect of an 
educational intervention, designed to improve individual grit, on primary school children. The 
training program involved a team of educational experts and school teachers, aiming at 
educating school children aged 8 to 10 years old to goal setting, perseverance and goal 
achievements. The effect of the training on the student population was measured by means of 
the incentivized real effort task, test scores and pre-and post-treatment questionnaires. The real 
effort game consisted in a grid where children had to find pairs of numbers that summed up to 
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100. There were two different types of grids, one easier to solve and the other more difficult, 
with two different rewards, four gifts for game solved versus only one gift for game solved. If 
the grid was not solved than players got zero gifts. Children had to choose at the beginning 
which type of reward/grid they wanted. The authors found that the treatment group, exposed 
to the educational training, were more likely to select the more rewarding incentive scheme 
engaging in the more difficult game. 
All these studies are examples of how it is possible to use real effort tasks in order to study the 
effect of incentives, effort provision and eventually the evolution of the decision process since 
early childhood. Applying real effort tasks has an important benefit: since the reward is the 
effect of an effort, controlling for individual ability, players clearly express their preferences.  
We introduce a real effort task in order to elicit individual risk preferences at early age. Our 
task is constructed in such a way that children earn, exerting an effort, the points that then 
represents the endowment used to play the risky lotteries. In this way, we do not provide 
children with house money to express their risk preferences, but we make them gaining their 
endowment avoiding windfall effect (Houser and Xiao, 2015).  
The real effort task is a simple game called SnackQuest, which required children to tap on 
balloons in order to pop them before a bee reached them. The choice of game was made in 
consultation with game designers to whom we asked specifically which video games were most 
played by boys and girls (the number of girls playing games is steadily increasing, and is now 
similar to that of boys, as documented by the families’ survey conducted by the Italian 
Statistical Office, ISTAT http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/91926). All of our participants declared 
they had played videogames of this type before and were familiar with iPads. 
 
The game lasted between 60 and 80 seconds and presented a maximum of 2 balloons that could 
be popped. Children obtained one point if they did not manage to pop any balloon, five points 
if they popped 1 balloon and ten points if they popped 2. 
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The points earned in the game were then used as initial endowment for the lotteries. Therefore, 
those who scored 1 point started the lottery with an endowment of 1, those who scored 5 points 
started the lottery with an endowment of 5 and who scored 10 points started the lottery with an 
endowment of 10. 
 
Translation: ‘You earned 1 point! Now you can try your luck: you will have five opportunities to choose between 
keeping your point, or trying your luck to increase it. One of those will be chosen by the computer as your final 
score, so pay attention to all of them!’ 
 
Upon completing the task, the screen displayed the total points collected and children were 
invited to move to the lotteries, which were presented as a succession of five screens each 
presenting two disks representing the safe choice always on the left hand side with its value 
clearly legible and the risky choice always on the right hand side with its two possible values 
clearly legible. Below is one example of the screens: 
 
Translation ‘Choose the pie you prefer’ 
 
Each lottery gave the choice between one safe option versus a risky option. Children had to 
choose for 5 times between these two alternatives. The lotteries have been designed following 
the Multiple Price List scheme (Holt and Laury, 2002) adapted by Dohmen et al.(2010). 
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Table 1: Lotteries design 
Endowment Cake A Cake  B 
   
1 1 point for sure 50% chance of getting 5 points and 50% of getting 0 points 
1 2 points for 
sure 
50% chance of getting 5 points and 50% of getting 0 points 
1 2.5 points for 
sure 
50% chance of getting 5 points and 50% of getting 0 points 
1 3 points for 
sure 
50% chance of getting 5 points and 50% of getting 0 points 
1 4 points for 
sure 
50% chance of getting 5 points and 50% of getting 0 points 
   
5 5 points for 
sure 
50% chance of getting 14 points and 50% of getting 0 
points 
5 6 points for 
sure 
50% chance of getting 14 points and 50% of getting 0 
points 
5 7 points for 
sure 
50% chance of getting 14 points and 50% of getting 0 
points 
5 8 points for 
sure 
50% chance of getting 14 points and 50% of getting 0 
points 
5 9 points for 
sure 
50% chance of getting 14 points and 50% of getting 0 
points 
   
10 10 points for 
sure 
50% chance of getting 25 points and 50% of getting 0 
points 
10 11 points for 
sure 
50% chance of getting 25 points and 50% of getting 0 
points 
10 12.5 points for 
sure 
50% chance of getting 25 points and 50% of getting 0 
points 
10 14 points for 
sure 
50% chance of getting 25 points and 50% of getting 0 
points 
10 15 points for 
sure 
50% chance of getting 25 points and 50% of getting 0 
points 
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We designed the scoring system so that the third choice was always the switching point from 
risky to safe choice at all endowment levels for a risk neutral child. This middle point offers 
exactly the same expected value as the risky choice, making the risk neutral decision maker 
indifferent between risky and safe choice. In the first two choices a risk neutral subject would 
choose the risky option, getting an expected value higher than if they had opted for the safe 
choice. In the last two options, a risk neutral individual would choose the safe option, getting 
a higher expected value. Risk loving children would select always the risky options, whereas 
risk averse children would choose always the safe option. Given the age of the participants and 
the difficulty in choosing between lotteries, we limited the number of choices and the 
variability in the prizes in order to make the lottery choice easy to understand. 
The computer programme randomly chose one of the five lotteries as the final score, and that 
was displayed in a final screen thanking participants and pointing them to the experimenters 
for converting their points into jellies. 
 
3. Results 
3.1 First stage: real effort task 
In line with the real effort literature, we found no significant gender differences in the first 
stage of the experiment (the video game), as Table 2 illustrates: 
Table 2 Average Score by gender  
Score in the 
 Real Effort Task Boys Girls Total 
    
1 29 25 54 
% 48.33 62.5 
 
    
5 23 12 35 
% 38.33 30 
 
    
10 8 3 11 
12 
 
% 13.33 7.5 
 
    
Total 60 40 100 
% 100 100 
 
 
We perform a ranksum test to analyse if there is a difference in scoring between girls and boys 
and if that difference is significant. The test has a p-value of 0.15 excluding a significant 
difference between scoring in the real effort task (Prob > |z| =   0.1485). 
This result is important because it suggests that there are no gender differences in performance 
when the task is designed in a gender neutral way and purely to elicit effort.  
 
3.2 The second stage: measuring risk through lotteries 
We observed the usual pattern of behaviour in lotteries, with switching from safe to risky 
options as the expected value of the risky options increased. This is important as it suggests 
children are behaving rationally and understand the way the choices were posed well. 
Figure 1 
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Share of risky choices in Lottery 3 Share of risky choices in Lottery 4
Share of risky choices in Lottery 5
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We also clearly observe gender differences in risky choices, with boys more willing to take 
risk at all endowments levels, as illustrated in figures 2-4 below: 
Figures 2-3-4: Gender differences in risky choice by initial endowments 
 
 
 
3.3 The effect of family and peers 
We were also interested in testing whether risky choices were affected by parental 
employment (and particularly whether the pupil’s mother works) as well the amount of time 
normally spent with peers and family, controlling for pupil’s gender and performance in the 
real effort task. In order to test for this, we run an OLS regression model of risky choice2, 
controlling for gender, performance in the real effort task and both parental employment and 
peer effects (measured by extra time spent with classmates in afterschool). The dependent 
variable Risky Choice is a count variable that adds together all the risky options taken by the 
                                                          
2 The dependent variable Risky Choice has been constructed as a count variable. For this reasons we 
performed a Poisson regression as additional estimation procedure. We did not find significant differences in 
the estimation outputs. Albeit, Poisson estimations that include more than three independent variables are 
non-significant.  
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players in the lottery. The players had to make a choice for each of the five lotteries; therefore 
the maximum value of Risky Choice is equal to 5 and the minimum value is zero, in case the 
player always chose a safe option. Game Score is a dummy variable equal to zero if the 
player got only one point in the SnackQuest game and equal to one if the player scored five 
or ten. Given that only eleven children scored ten in the SnackQuest game, we decided to 
create a variable Game Score grouping players scoring five and ten versus who got one in the 
game. Mother in Work and Father in Work are dummy variables equal to one if the parent 
has a job, we do not distinguish between permanent and temporary jobs. Afterschool is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the kid spends additional time at school for extra curriculum 
activities. 
 
 
Table 3: Parental and peer influences on risky choices 
Risky Choices (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Female -0.983 -1.027 -1.000 -1.027 -1.026 
 (0.344)** (0.349)** (0.355)** (0.353)** (0.352)** 
Game Score  -0.087 -0.096 -0.088 -0.086 
  (0.336) (0.339) (0.341) (0.341) 
Afterschool  -0.165  -0.163 -0.169 
  (0.364)  (0.389) (0.387) 
Mother in 
Work 
  0.046 0.085 0.021 
   (0.389) (0.412) (0.395) 
Father in work   -0.764 -0.749  
   (0.828) (0.838)  
Constant 3.283 3.389 4.048 4.057 3.373 
 (0.201)** (0.281)** (0.804)** (0.815)** (0.406)** 
R2 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.08 
N        100        100        100        100        100 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
Robust Standard Errors in parentheses 
 
 
The regression analysis confirms the gender effect illustrated with the figures in section 3.2. 
We do not find evidence of either parental or peer effects in our sample, although this is 
probably due to the relatively small sample size. 
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4. Conclusions 
Our paper contributes to the literature seeking to understand if gender differences in risk 
preferences arise during childhood. We test gender differences in risk in children making use 
of a real effort task, which allows us to enter endowments that are earned in a gender neutral 
task designed to elicit pure effort, thus providing differentiated endowments by effort and 
enabling to control for performance. We develop a videogame that is designed for this purpose 
and a visual representation of lotteries that allows overcoming the problems children normally 
face in evaluating probabilities and understanding monetary values. 
Our findings confirm gender differences in risk in children of primary school age, which has 
very important implications for the design of school curricula and education programmes more 
widely: much mathematical testing and activities fitting within the science curricula, for 
example, are often based on pupils taking risks, which could in and of itself lead to gender bias 
in the performance of pupils, and contribute to the explanation of why girls’ maths 
achievements are often below those of boys in Italy.  
Worldwide the achievements in maths by girls have been found to be strongly connected with 
the wider gender norms of societies (Guiso et al, 2008), as well as a range of differences in 
cognitive and emotional factors, but even in countries where girls outperform boys in this 
subject, such as the UK, they often opt out of continuing to study them for reasons associated 
with a range of issues including gender stereotyping and school environments (Favara, 2012) 
and parental (and particularly mothers’) attitudes Johnston et al (2014). As a result, and there 
is a gender gap in the choice of science and maths subjects (Institute of Physics, 2013; Smith 
and Golding, 2015) that affects the selection of women out of STEM subjects (Science, 
Technology, Engineering and Maths) at University and in the labour market, with important 
effects on pay gaps, career gaps and individual and household outcomes later on (Petrongolo 
and Olivetti, 2008; Ceci and Williams, 2010).  
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